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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Was the stop and questioning of defendants based on 
an articulable reasonable suspicion that defendants had committed 
a crime? 
2. Was the two-piece VCR seized and admitted into 
evidence particularly described in the search warrant? 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
- v -
GERALD W. DEITMAN and 
ALBERT D. LOZANO, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 20584 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendants, Gerald W. Deitman and Albert D. Lozano, 
were each charged with one count of burglary, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann., § 76-6-202 (1978) 
(Addendum A), and one count of theft, a third degree felony in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1978) (Addendum B). 
Defendants were convicted of the charged crimes in a 
non-jury trial before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah on 
February 4, 1985. Both defendants were sentenced to a prison 
term of 0-5 years. The judge stayed execution of the prison 
terms and both defendants were placed on probation for 18 months 
and fined (R. 69, 76) . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 1, 1984 at approximately 2:30 a.m., Salt Lake 
City Police Officers Morgan Sayes and Ken Schoney responded in 
separate patrol cars to a burglar alarm at International Video, 
40 East 1300 South in Salt Lake City (R. 162, 184-185, 202, 291). 
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International Video is located in a business district with 
limited residential housing (R. 197, 207). Upon arriving at the 
scene, both officers observed a pickup truck with a camper shell 
parked across the street from International Video (R. 185-86, 
202, 205). Both officers observed an occupant in the truck turn 
on the truck's headlights, start the truck and drive the truck 
from the officers in a southbound direction (R. 187, 211). 
Except for the truck, there were very few vehicles parked on 
either side of 1300 South (R. 187, 197). 
Officer Sayes then followed the truck to 1492 South 
Edison, waited for defendants to exit the truck, asked defendants 
for identification, and ran a warrant check. He found an 
outstanding warrant for defendant Lozano; however, he did not 
arrest him (R. 199). As part of the investigation of the 
reported burglary, he questioned the defendants as to their past 
activities that night, then left the defendants and returned to 
International Video (R. 188-91). Upon his return, he learned 
from other police officers and the store owner that a burglary 
had actually been committed and that a two-piece VCR had been 
stolen (R. 162, 190, 203). Officers then obtained a serial 
number from the store owner. 
Soon thereafter, Officer Sayes returned to 1492 South 
Edison accompanied by other officers including Bruce Smith (R. 
191). Officer Sayes shined his flashlight through a rear window 
in defendant Deitmanfs camper, the same camper officers observed 
leaving the vicinity of the reported burglary. He "saw a corner 
of something," but could not identify it (R. 195). Subsequently, 
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he knocked on defendant Lozano's door and both defendants agreed 
to talk with the officers. Deitman said the officers could look 
in the truck but could not get into the truck (R. 294). Officer 
Smith then shined his flashlight in the rear window of the camper 
and saw a "black rectangular object with what appeared to be a 
memory switch" (R. 295). 
The defendants were then placed under arrest (R. 193, 
204) and the truck, registered to defendant Deitman (R. 294), was 
not searched at that time, but was taken to an impound lot (R. 
299, 303). A search warrant was obtained the next day. The 
store owner gave police one serial number which was placed in the 
search warrant. The search warrant described the property to be 
seized as "a two-piece RCA VCR Model VGP 170, serial number 
202510058" (addendum C). The serial number on the VCR (State's 
Exhibit No. 5) was 2025H0058 (R306). The owner did not inform 
the police of the serial number on the other piece of the VCR, 
State's Exhibit No. 6 (R. 306). 
The truck was searched on May 2, 1984 (R. 299, 304) and 
a two-piece RCA video recorder was found in the camper matching 
the description of the one stolen from International Video. 
Defendants were both charged with burglary and theft, third 
degree felonies. Judge Wilkinson admitted the VCR after 
considering defendants' motion to suppress the evidence. 
Thereafter, the defendants were found guilty of burglary and 
theft. 
_*> _ 
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SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT 
The brief stop and questioning of defendants was 
justified by the officer's reasonable suspicion that defendants 
had committed a burglary. The facts as known to the officer, 
viewed from an objective standard, supported the officer's 
suspicion of criminal activity. 
The two-piece VCR seized by the officers was described 
with particularity in the search warrant and was properly 
admitted at trial. , 
ARGUMENT v 
POINT I 
SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION EXISTED TO STOP 
AND QUESTION DEFENDANTS BASED UPON A 
REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT A CRIME HAD 
BEEN COMMITTED AND THE EVIDENCE SEIZED 
AS A RESULT OF THE STOP WAS PROPERLY 
ADMITTED AT TRIAL. 
This Court recently expressed concern about the failure 
of the parties to brief relevant state constitutional questions 
in criminal cases, particularly in the area of search and 
seizurer -S££ State v. Earl, 30 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (1986); £i&i£ 
v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 271-73 (Utah 1985) (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring). The State will first address the question of 
whether the analysis of the officer's actions in this case should 
differ under Art. I S 14 of the Utah Constitution from a fourth 
amendment analysis even though the trial court's ruling assumes 
that the analysis is the same as that applied under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
This Court has traditionally construed Art. I § 14 and 
the Fourth Amendment, which textually are nearly identical, as 
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providing the same scope of protection. S&& e.g. State v. 
Criscola. 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 517 (1968); State V, Lopes, 
552 P.2d 120 (Utah 1976). Recognizing, of course, that the Court 
may be rethinking its past application of Art. I, S 14, it is the 
State1s position that there is no good reason why, in this case, 
the Court should construe the Utah constitutional provision more 
narrowly than the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted so as to 
characterize Office Sayes' action an illegal investigative 
detention. 
Because it is the State1s position that the analysis of 
this case under Art. I § 14 should be the same as that under the 
Fourth Amendment, the remainder of this argument does not 
separately analyze the two constitutions but treats them as if 
the same analysis applied to both. 
Under both constitutional provisions, the initial stop 
and questioning by Officer Sayes was justified by his reasonable 
suspicion that a crime had been committed. Utah Code Ann. § 77-
7-15 (1982) provides: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or 
is in the act of committing or is attempting 
to commit a public offense and may demand 
his name, address and an explanation of his 
actions. 
A brief detention is warranted where the circumstances do not 
constitute probable cause for arrest, however there is need for a 
temporary detention to investigate and obtain more information 
about possible criminal activity. 
A brief stop of a suspicious individual, 
in order to determine his identity or to 
-5-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
maintain the status quo momentarily while 
obtaining more information, may be most 
reasonable in light of the facts known to 
the officer at the time. ^ 
Adams v. Williams. 407 U.S. 143 (1972). The stop and questioning 
is an "intermediate response" so that a police officer "who lacks 
• . . probable cause to arrest [need not] shrug his shoulders and 
allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape." Adams v. 
Williams, .supra at 145. See also: State v. Torres, 29 Utah 2d 
269
 r 508 P.2d 534 (1973). Law enforcement officers must be able, 
"in appropriate circumstances, and in an appropriate manner [to] 
approach a person for purpose of investigating possibly criminal 
behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an 
arrest," United States v. Place. 462 U.S. 696, 704 (1983), 
When a police officer sees or hears conduct 
which gives rise to a suspicion of crime, 
he has not only the right but the duty to 
make observations and investigations to 
determine whether the law is being violated, 
and if so, to take such measures as are 
necessary in the enforcement of the law. 
State v. Folkes, 565 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Utah 1977), £eri. jfeaifidr 
434 U.S. 971 (1977). State v. Whittenback. 621 P.2d 103, 105 
(Utah 1980) . 
Appellants contend the initial stop and questioning by 
Officer Sayes was unjustified since no probable cause existed. 
However, the law is established that an officer need not have 
probable cause to make an initial stop but only reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity. Adams v» Williams, supra; United 
States v. Place, supra; State v. Whittenback. supra. Further, an 
officer may approach a citizen at any time and pose questions so 
~fi-
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long as the citizen is not detained against his will.l United 
States v, Merritt. 936 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984); Florida V. 
RQX£JL, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). 
The following facts, viewed objectively, justified the 
initial stop of defendants: (1) officers responded to a burglar 
alarm at approximately 2:30 a.m. (R. 161-162, 184-185, 202, 291); 
(2) at the time of the officers' arrival Defendant Deitman's 
camper pickup truck was parked across the street from the 
reported burglary (R. 185-186, 202, 205); (3) immediately upon 
the arrival of the officers at the reported burglary the officers 
observed defendants turn on the headlights, start the truck and 
drive south from the reported burglary (R. 197, 207); (4) the 
area of the reported burglary is a business district with minimal 
traffic at 2:30 a.m. (R. 187, 197); (5) few cars were parked in 
the immediate vicinity of International Video other than 
Deitman's truck (R. 187, 211). Based on the facts Officer Sayes 
1 Police encounters with the public can be divided into three 
separate levels: 
(1) an officer may approach a citizen at 
anytime (sic) and pose questions so long as the 
citizen is not detained against his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an "articulable suspicion" 
that the person has committed or is about 
to commit a crime; however, the "detention 
must be temporary and last no longer than 
is necessary to effectuate the purpose of 
the stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a 
suspect if the officer has probable cause 
to believe an offense has been committed 
or is being committed. See Florida v. Royer. 
460 U.S. 491, 498-499, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 
1324-25, 75 L.Ed.2d 229, 236-37 (1983). 
United States v. Mgrritt, 936 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984). 
_ " 7 -
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i 
had reason to suspect defendants were involved in criminal 
activity. These facts should be considered in the light in which 
i 
they appeared to the officer at the time of the stop when 
determining whether the officer was justified under the 
circumstances. These facts together with rational inferences, 
reasonably supported a temporary detention to investigate 
defendants' actions. The defendants' timing of departure, 
compounded by the time of night, the location of the burglary in 
a business district, and the scarcity of traffic or parked cars 
was sufficient to justify a fair-minded person's inquiry into the 
circumstances of the defendants' actions. 
Initially, Officer Sayes approached defendants and 
posed questions as part of the investigation of the alarm, prior 
to learning a burglary had been committed, however, this initial 
encounter was not a detention against defendants' will (R. 188-
191) and as such did not constitute a seizure. See United States 
v, Merritt, supra at 230. Further, an officer need not know that 
a crime has occurred and that defendants are guilty; he need only 
reasonably suspect that one has occurred or is occurring and that 
defendants are involved in its occurrence, Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-
15 (1982). Therefore, although the officer may not have had 
probable cause to arrest defendants at the time he stopped them 
initially for questioning, the officer did have reasonable 
suspicion to stop defendants and inquire about the activity in 
which they were engaged. Further, the officer had justification 
to question defendants to determine if they observed anything 
which could make them possible witnesses of criminal activity. 
-8-
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Defendants cite two cases wherein evidence was 
suppressed because the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to 
stop and question the defendants, however these cases are 
distinguishable from the instant case. 
In State v. Swanigan. 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985) , a 
residence was burglarized at approximately 10:30 p.m. Upon 
learning of the burglary, an officer who had earlier seen two men 
walking near the burglarized residence radioed their description 
to the police dispatcher. Other officers stopped the defendant 
at approximately 1:30 a.m. based upon information received over 
the radio. In the subsequent pat-down search of the pair, 
officers discovered some of the stolen property from the 
burglarized residence. This court found that the arresting 
officers lacked a reasonable suspicion to stop defendant and his 
companion because no evidence existed that defendants had been at 
the scene of the crime. The stop was based solely on a 
description by a fellow officer who had observed the two walking 
along the street at a late hour in an area where recent 
burglaries had been reported. 
In the instant case officers responded to a burglar 
alarm at approximately 2:30 a.m. and observed defendants across 
the street leave in a truck. The burglarized store was in a 
business district where traffic is minimal, at best, at 2:30 a.m. 
and few automobiles were parked in the vicinity. The questioning 
of defendants by the officer was justified by the fact that the 
officer had just observed defendants leave the immediate vicinity 
of the reported burglary. The officer had a duty to determine if 
-9-
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defendants had observed any criminal activity or if defendants 
were in fact involved in any criminal activity. In contrast, the 
officers in Swanigan who stopped the defendant had neither 
observed nor had knowledge that defendant had been at the scene 
of the crime, Swanigan, supra at 719. 
In State v. Carpena. 27 Utah Adv. Rep. 29, 30 (1968), 
this Court held that officers did not have reasonable suspicion 
to stop defendants who were driving slowly in a car with out-of-
state license plates in a residential area late at night. The 
officers had not observed any criminal activity nor had any been 
reported. The facts as presented did not give the officers a 
reasonable suspicion that the men were involved in any criminal 
activity. 
In Carpena. the officer had no objective facts on which 
to base a reasonable suspicion that the men were involved in 
criminal activity whereas in the instant case the officer had 
just responded to a burglar alarm at 2:30 a.m. and observed 
defendants leave the immediate vicinity of the reported burglary. 
Based upon the facts, viewed objectively, the officer not only , 
had the right but the duty to question defendants, .State V» 
ZolUfiLSf supra at 1127. 
As the facts indicate in the instant case, the police 
officer's reasonable suspicion of defendant's actions in 
satisfaction of Utah Code Ann. S 77-7-15 (1982) were justified. 
Therefore, the trial court's finding of probable cause to 
effectuate a stop and questioning must be upheld. 
-10-
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POINT II 
THE TWO-PIECE VCR (STATE'S EXHIBITS 
5 AND 6) WAS PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED 
IN THE SEARCH WARRANT AND WAS PROPERLY 
ADMITTED AT TRIAL. 
Defendants claim their rights were prejudiced because 
the search warrant contained only one of the two serial numbers 
on the two-piece VCR. Further, the one serial number given in 
the search warrant contained a misplaced number. This Court has 
declined to rule on issues raised by defendants when they fail to 
support their argument by any legal analysis or authority. .£££. 
State v, Amiconef 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). Defendants 
offer no legal authority or analysis to support a claim of a 
prejudicial search warrant. In fact, defendants admit that the 
discrepancy in the serial numbers is not, by itself, adequate to 
show that the two-piece VCR is "inherently unidentifiable." 
Therefore, this argument should be dismissed for lack of legal 
substantiation. 
Assuming defendants had supported their argument with 
legal analysis the two-piece VCR was particularly described in 
the search warrant and properly admitted at trial. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-3 (1982), as amended, states in 
part: 
(1) A search warrant shall not issue except 
upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation particularly describing the person 
or place to be searched and the person, 
property or evidence to be seized. (emphasis 
added). 
A search warrant must enable the police officer to reasonably 
ascertain and identify the things which are authorized to be 
seized. Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503-04 (1925). 
- n -
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The danger this Court perceives and that Utah Code Ann. 
S 77-23-3 (1982) attempts to avoid is general warrants whereby 
police officers are given licenses to explore or rummage at their 
discretion through an individual's belongings looking for 
evidence. This Court recently dealt with such a case in which 
the search warrant ordered seizure of "all controlled substances 
and stolen property. * State v. Gallegos. 23 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 
24 (1985). In pallegos this court held it was unacceptable for a 
police officer to conduct an off-premises investigation to 
establish probable cause to seize property (a VCR) not designated 
in the search warrant. 
This Court does not favor invalidating search warrants 
because of minor technical deficiencies in the warrant's 
description. State V. Anderson, 11 Utah Adv. Rep. 46, 48 (1985). 
In United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109 (1965), the 
United States Supreme Court stated: 
Technical requirements of elaborate specificity 
once exacted under common law pleadings have 
no proper place in this area. A grudging or 
negative attitude by reviewing courts toward 
warrants will tend to discourage police officers 
from submitting their evidence to a judicial 
officer before acting. 
Furthermore, in evaluating the particularity requirement of 
warrants, courts must avoid hypertechnical approaches, United 
States V. Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 753 (3rd Cir. 1982), by 
following "the Fourth Amendment's commands, like all 
constitutional requirements, that are practical and not 
abstract." United States v. Ventresca, jsupid at 108. The 
inclusion of a slightly erroneous numerical series does not give 
—i o— 
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rise to a discretionary determination on the part of the 
executing officer. United States v. Rytman, 475 F.2d 192 (5th 
Cir. 1973). 
In the instant case the search warrant described with 
particularity the item to be seized. It properly described the 
item to be seized as "a two-piece RCA VCR model VGP 170, serial 
#202510058" (Addendum C). The serial number in the warrant 
matches exactly State's Exhibit No. 5 with the exception of one 
misplaced number (Addendum C). The serial number on the VCR was 
2025H0058 (R. 306). Thus, eight of the nine numbers match 
correctly. Even though the serial number for State's Exhibit No. 
6 was not in the search warrant, an adequate description of the 
VCR already existed so Officer Smith could reasonably ascertain 
the items to be seized. Since the particularity of a description 
in a warrant "varies with the circumstances and with the nature 
of the property to be seized, " State v. Gallegos, .sii^ ia, at 24 
(citations omitted), the trial court correctly determined that 
both serial numbers in their complete form were not necessary for 
a particularized description. The defendants offer no evidence 
that the search warrant in the present case sanctioned a general 
exploratory search of defendant's camper. 
Since the trial court found ample particularization in 
the search warrant, and since the defendants offer no legal 
substantiation to show otherwise, the respondents respectfully 
request that this Court affirm the judgment and conviction. 
-13-
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( 
CONCLUSION 
Since Officer Sayes had a reasonable suspicion that 
defendants had been involved in criminal activity and since the 
search warrant particularly described the stolen two-piece VCR, 
the trial court's decision to dismiss the motion by defendants to 
suppress the evidence was correct. Respondent seeks affirmation 
of the verdict and judgment of the lower court. 
DATED this<2JL day of Mayf 1986. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
^t£j^ 
KIMBERLY K. HORNAK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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I hereby c e r t i f y that I mailed four true and exact 
copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief , postage prepaid, to 
Brooke C. Wel l s , attorney for appel lant , Sa l t Lake Legal Defender 
Assoc iat ion , 333 South Second East , S a l t Lake City , Utah 84111, 
t h i s J? 7 day of May, 1986. 
Stcm&X ^ ' tfy,**,aJdf' 
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ADDENDUM A 
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76-6-202. Burglary.—(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters 
or remains unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with 
intent to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it was committed 
in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of the second degree. 
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76-6412. Theft—Classification of offenses—Action for treble damages 
against receiver of stolen property.—(1) Theft of property and services 
as provided in this chapter shall be punishable as follows: 
(a) As a felony of the second degree if: 
(i) The value of the property or services exceeds $1,000; or 
(ii) The property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; or 
(iii) The actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft; 
or 
(iv) The property is stolen from the person of another. 
(b) As a felony of the third degree if: 
(i) The value of the property or services is more than $250 but not 
more than $1,000; or 
(ii) The actor has been twice before convicted of theft of property or 
•ervices valued at $250 or less; or 
(iii) When the property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, 
heifer, steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry. 
(c) As a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was 
more than $100 but does not exceed $250. 
(d) As a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was 
$100 or less. 
(2) Any person who has been injured by a violation of subsection 
(1), of section 76-6-408 may bring an action against any person mentioned 
in (d) for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by 
the plaintiff, costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
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I ..• 
IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SEARCH WARRANT y 
•L. No. m& 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
To any peace officer in the State of Utah. 
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by 
Bruoe L» Smith - SLCPD • * am satisfied that there is probable cause to beli 
That ( ) on the person (s) of 
(>j in the vehicle(s) described as 1965 Ford Pick-Up, F-10, white 
PPlori Utah License #Ifl5Q94 
( ) on the premises known as 
In the City of Salt Lake , County of Salt Lake 
State of Utah, there is now being possessed or concealed certain property or 
evidence described as: 
A 2-pieoe RCA VCR Model VGP 170, serial #202510058 
which property or evidence: 
(x) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed. 
( ) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense. 
( ) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of 
committing or concealing a public offense, 
(x) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct 
possessed by a party to the illegal conduct. 
( ) is evidence of illegal conduct in possession of a person or 
entity not a party to the illegal conduct and good cause beinc 
shown that the seizure cannot be obtained by subpoena without 
the evidence being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered. 
(Conditions for service of this warrant are included or attacl 
hereto.) 
You are therefore commanded: 
(x) in the day time 
( ) at any time day or night (good cause having been shown) 
( ) to execute without notice of authority or purpose, (proof 
under oath being shown that the object of this search may 
be quickly destroyed or disposed of or that harm may result 
to any person if notice were given) 
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PAGE TWO 
SEARCH WARRANT 
to make a search of the above-named or described person(s), vehicle(s), and 
premises for the herein-above described property or evidence and if you find 
the same or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith before me at the 
Fifth Circuit Court, County of Salt 
perty in your custody, subject to the oj 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this 
COURT 
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IN THE COURT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RETURN TO SEARCH WARRANT 
«>• Often 
The personal property ( l i s ted below/set out on the inventcjf^attached> 
hereto) was taken from the premises located and described as 
and from tbe^veSicle (s)^rffescribed as (pS pt^-d fU -/"V f) 
^—•— c/^ir^ ^ , 0 /^Aitro?1/ 
and from the person (s) of ilUfJT-
by virtue of a search warrant dated the ^ day of r<A [L/^t4\ » 19 
and executed by Judge 
of the above-entitled court: 
*SW - Page 1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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I . tflltti/ J/HVUA by whom this warrant 
was executed, do swear that the (above/attached) inventory contains a true and 
detai led account of a l l the property taken by me under the warrant, on //^JifJ 
2— 19&U. 1  c 
All of the property taken by virtue of said warrant will be retained 
in »y custody subject to the order of this court of or any other court in 
which the offense in respect to which the property or things taken, is triable 
$AML<^w?^ 
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IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT 
I!J AND FOR THE SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS 
County of Salt Lake ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE: Eleanor S. Lewis , 451 South 200 East 
JUDGE ADDRESS 
The undersigned affiant being first du]y sworn, deposes and says: 
That he/atex has reason to believe 
That ( ) en the person (s) of ___ 
(X) in the vehicle (s) described as 1965 Tord Pickup F-1Q, white in color 
Utah License 4LN 5094 
( ) on the premises known as 
In the City of Salt Lake , County of Salt Lake, State cf Utah, there 
is now certain property or evidence described as: 
a 2 - piece RCA VCR, Model VGP 170, Serial #202510058 
and that said property or evidence: 
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; 
( ) has been used to coirjr.it or conceal a public offense; 
( ) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means of 
committing or concealing a public offense; 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, 
possessed by a party to the illegal conduct; 
( ) consists, .of-an^i^en or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, 
possessed by'p.'b^rson or entity not a party to the illegal 
conduct.- [Xo't'e'requirements of Utah Code Annotated, 77-23-3(2)] 
Affiant believes^te ptc^vrtV'in^^evidencc described above is evidence of the 
crime(s) of Burglary'and Theft 
03'Tn 
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AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are: 
On or about March 1, 1984 at 0103, a silent alarm sounded for International 
Video within four (4) mintues officers Schovey and Sayes arrived at the 
scene and observed the above described vehicle start up and leave. Officer Sayes 
followed the vehicle to the residence of Mr. Lozano at 1492 Edison. 
Scott Shiotani, cwner of the victim business identified the above described 2-
piece VCR as being stolen from his business on the night in question. 
Your affiantf an experience police officer, was able to look thru the windew 
of the vehicle and observed what appeared to be a 2-piece VCR. 
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PAGE THREE 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
Vour affiant considers the information received from the confidential informar 
reliable because (if any information is obtained from an unnamed source) 
K/A 
Your affiant has verified the above information from the confidential inform: 
to be correct and accurate through the following independent investigation: 
N/A 
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PAGE FOUR 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the seizure 
of said items: 
(X) in the day time. 
( ) at any time day or night because there is reason to believe it 
is necessary to seize the property prior to it being concealed, 
destroyed, damaged, or altered, or for other good reasons, to 
wit: 
It is further requested that (if appropriate) the officer executing the requested 
warrant not be required to give notice of the officer's authority or purpose 
because: 
( ) physical harm may result to any person if notice were given; or 
( ) the property sought may be quickly destroyed, disposed of, or 
secreted. 
This danger is believed to exist because: 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME 
U-^i L^: /P 
IN AND FOR SALT 
STATE OF UTAH 
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